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Abstract. Pseudorandom functions are traditionally built upon block
ciphers, but with the trend of permutation based cryptography, it is a
natural question to investigate the design of pseudorandom functions
from random permutations. We present a generic study of how to build
beyond birthday bound secure pseudorandom functions from public ran-
dom permutations. We first show that a pseudorandom function based
on a single permutation call cannot be secure beyond the 2n/2 birthday
bound, where n is the state size of the function. We next consider the
Sum of Even-Mansour (SoEM) construction, that instantiates the sum of
permutations with the Even-Mansour construction. We prove that SoEM
achieves tight 2n/3-bit security if it is constructed from two independent
permutations and two randomly drawn keys. We also demonstrate a
birthday bound attack if either the permutations or the keys are iden-
tical. Finally, we present the Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers (SoKAC)
construction, a translation of Encrypted Davies-Meyer Dual to a public
permutation based setting, and show that SoKAC achieves tight 2n/3-bit
security even when a single key is used.
Keywords: RP-to-PRF, SoEM, SoKAC, beyond the birthday bound
1 Introduction
In the seminal work of Luby and Rackoff [47], a paradigm of constructing a
pseudorandom permutation (PRP) from a pseudorandom function (PRF) was
introduced. Their work, motivated by the DES block cipher, consists of an r-
round Feistel construction involving independent invocations of a PRF. Soon
people realized that they actually needed the opposite construction, i.e., con-
structing a PRF from a PRP. The reason for this is two-fold: (i) PRPs are easier
to design than PRFs and (ii) many cryptographic schemes, such as counter mode,
are better off if instantiated with a PRF.
The classical PRP-PRF switch [6, 8, 19, 38, 41], which consists of taking an
n-bit block cipher EK as a PRF, is only secure up to the birthday bound: an
attacker that can learn around 2n/2 evaluations of EK can distinguish it from
random. Although this bound is acceptable for large enough n, in light of the rise
of lightweight block ciphers [3, 4, 16, 18, 30, 36, 40, 46, 62, 67] this bound is on the
edge for certain applications. For example, for a 64-bit block cipher, breaking
security requires approximately 232 · 64 bits of data, which is approximately
35GB. Of a similar kind, Bhargavan and Leurent [13] performed practical attacks
on TLS and OpenVPN when a 64-bit block cipher is used.
Various approaches of turning a PRP into a PRF with beyond birthday
bound security have been introduced. Hall et al. [38] suggested truncation:
truncm(EK(M)), an approach that was later proven to be secure up to around
2n−m/2 queries [5,35]. Bellare et al. [7] proposed the sum of permutations (SoP),
EK1(M)⊕ EK2(M) , (1)
a construction that is known to achieve q/2n security [5, 28, 48, 57]. Cogliati
and Seurin [24] introduced the Encrypted Davies-Meyer (EDM) construction,
EK2(EK1(M)⊕M), and proved that it is 22n/3 secure. Mennink and Neves [50]
improved the security to be 2n using Patarin’s mirror theory [53,55,57,58]. They
also introduced the dual: EK2(EK1(M)) ⊕ EK1(M), called Encrypted Davies-
Mayer Dual (EDMD), and showed that its security is implied by that of the sum
of permutations.
All constructions, however, are yet based on block ciphers. Even stronger,
they only evaluate EK in the forward direction. As block ciphers are designed
to be efficient in both the forward and inverse direction, these are thus over-
engineered primitives for this purpose. This is in contrast with the modern trend
in cryptography, namely that of permutation based cryptography, where the
underlying permutations are particularly developed to be fast in the forward
direction, but not necessarily in the inverse direction. Examples of cryptographic
permutations include Keccak [12], Gimli [9], and SPONGENT [15].
So what we really need is a PRF designed from public permutations, but the
state of the art in this direction is scarce. To our knowledge, the only notable
approach in this direction are the keyed sponge [1,11,52] and Farfalle [10], how-
ever these constructions have been developed with different incentives in mind.
Most importantly, they are variable-length, and for small fixed length messages
better solutions may be possible.
Acknowledgedly, the state size of a permutation is typically larger than the
block size n of a message: whereas AES has a block size of 128 bits, making the
naive birthday bound PRP-PRF switch on the edge, the SHA-3 permutation is
of size 1600 bits, and a simple Even-Mansour [32] construction on top of it would
give a PRP that behaves like a PRF up to an attack complexity of 2800. However,
this example permutation is on the extreme end: lightweight permutations such
as SPONGENT [15] and PHOTON [37] go as low as 88 and 100 bits, respectively.
For these types of permutations, birthday bound solutions are inadequate.
2
1.1 Towards Birthday Bound Security
Suppose we take the sum of permutations (1), and want to turn it into a PRF
conversion function for a public random permutation. Recall that the sum of
permutations is secure up to complexity 2n as long as the underlying block
ciphers are secure. A naive way of proceeding is to plug the Even-Mansour block
cipher construction
EMK(M) = pi(M ⊕K)⊕K ,
where pi is an n-bit permutation, into the sum of permutations. However, the
Even-Mansour construction is known to be tightly 2n/2 birthday bound secure.
A simple modular reasoning, in turn, leaves us with an unsatisfiable birthday
bound security level.
One way to resolve this is by eschewing the Even-Mansour construction in
favor of multiple-round Even-Mansour. For example, 2-round Even-Mansour is
secure up to complexity around 22n/3, and the generic composition of the sum of
permutation with this construction guarantees security up to the same level as
well. On the other hand, the scheme has become twice as expensive in the number
of primitive evaluations: it is based on four permutation calls. Fortunately, the
poor bound of the composition of the sum of permutations with Even-Mansour
is not inherent to the scheme, but rather, it is due to a lossy composition. A
dedicated analysis can render an improved bound.
1.2 Our Contribution
We tackle the problem of designing a PRF from a public random permutation
from a generalized perspective. First, we consider the general design of a PRF
based on one and only one public permutation that is preceded and followed
by linear mappings, and demonstrate that such construction cannot be secure
beyond the birthday bound. The proof consists of considering different types of
linear mappings, and deriving attacks in the birthday bound (or faster) for all
variants. The result is given in Section 3.
Our second and main contribution centers around the sum of permutations
instantiated with Even-Mansour, a construction which we dub SoEM: (Sum of
Even Mansour). It is based on two permutations pi1, pi2, and it either takes two
keys K1,K2 (one before and after each permutation) or it takes a single key K
(added before each permutation, and to the final sum). We derive the following
results in Section 4:
(i) If pi1 = pi2, so if both Even-Mansour constructions are instantiated using
the same permutation, SoEM can be broken in complexity around 2n/2;
(ii) If pi1 and pi2 are independent, and the construction takes a single key K,
SoEM can again be broken in complexity around 2n/2;
(iii) If pi1 and pi2 are independent, and so are K1 and K2, the resulting con-
struction is tightly secure up to complexity 22n/3.
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The proof of (iii) is performed in the ideal permutation model, using Patarin’s
H-coefficient technique [21, 54, 56]. It resembles ideas of the first iteration in
Patarin’s mirror theory [57], but difficulties appear in the fact that the permu-
tations pi1, pi2 can be queried by the distinguisher.
The result sparks curiosity on whether 2n/3-security is also achievable by a
construction based on a single key. We answer this question positively by intro-
ducing SoKAC (Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers) in Section 5. SoKAC reminds
of EDMD instantiated with Even-Mansour, barring subtle differences, but it
can likewise be seen as adding a 1-round Key Alternating Cipher (KAC) [17]
to a 2-round one. By putting the first permutation equal in both KACs, the
construction makes in total two permutation calls per evaluation. Whereas the
scheme is only birthday bound secure if the permutations are identical, i.e. if
pi1 = pi2, for the case of independent permutations the construction achieves
2n/3-security even though it only relies on a single n-bit key. The proof is based
on the sum-capture lemma [2,20,25,51,63].
1.3 Our Contribution in Bigger Perspective
Conversion from public or secret permutations to public or secret functions and
vice versa is a fundamental problem in symmetric key cryptography, and our
work fills the last remaining notable gap in the picture.
We already discussed the issue of PRF-to-PRP conversion: Luby and Rack-
off [47] described the Feistel network, a method still used to design block ci-
phers. Reversely, PRP-to-PRF conversion was covered by SoP [7], EDM [24],
and EDMD [50].
One can consider similar techniques for conversion between public random
permutations (RPs) and public random functions (RFs). In this setting, the
functions are keyless, and one assumes ideality of the underlying primitives in
order to prove security in the indifferentiability framework [49]. The Feistel con-
struction has seen notable indifferentiability analysis [26, 27, 29], and so has the
sum of permutation construction [14,23,51].
Note that there is little incentive to investigate conversion from PRP/PRF
to RP/RF. The Even-Mansour construction [32] transforms an RP to a PRP; it
has been generalized in [17,21,31,39,44,64]. Gentry and Ramzan [34] proposed
the idea of combining the Feistel construction and the Even-Mansour cipher,
which was later named the Key Alternating Feistel (KAF) cipher by Lampe
and Seurin [45]. In the work of Gazi and Tessaro [33], a construction that turns
RFs into PRF has been introduced. Moreover, the Whitened Swap-or-Not con-
struction by Tessaro [65] provides another way of building nearly optimal n-bits
secure PRP from RPs or RFs.
This leaves the problem of RP-to-PRF conversion, i.e. the problem consid-
ered in this work. The full picture of example conversion techniques is given in
Figure 1.
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Fig. 1: Conversion among PRP, PRF, RP, and RF. The given example construc-
tions are not exhaustive.
2 Preliminaries
For n ∈ N, we denote by {0, 1}n the set of bit strings of length n. For two
bit strings X,Y ∈ {0, 1}n, we denote their bitwise addition as X ⊕ Y . For a
value Z, we denote by A ← Z the assignment of Z to the variable A. For a
finite set S, we denote by S $←− S the uniformly random selection of S from S.
We denote by Func(n) the set of all functions on {0, 1}n and by Perm(n) the
set of all permutations on {0, 1}n. We denote by 〈t〉n the encoding of a value
t ∈ {0, . . . , 2n − 1} as an n-bit string.
For k, n, r ∈ N, let F : {0, 1}k×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a function that is based
on r n-bit permutations pi1, . . . , pir. We will consider pseudorandom function
security of F , where we assume that pi1, . . . , pir
$←− Perm(n), and where the
distinguisher D is given access to either (Fpi1,...,pirK , pi±1 , . . . , pi±r ) for secret key
K
$←− {0, 1}k or (ϕ, pi±1 , . . . , pi±r ) for ϕ $←− Func(n), where the superscript ± for
the pii’s indicates that the distinguisher has bi-directional access. Its goal is to
determine which oracle it is given access to:
AdvprfF (D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DFpi1,...,pirK ,pi±1 ,...,pi±r = 1]− Pr [Dϕ,pi±1 ,...,pi±r = 1]∣∣∣ , (2)
for K
$←− {0, 1}k, pi1, . . . , pir $←− Perm(n), and ϕ $←− Func(n).
In the remainder of this work, we will focus on keys of size n or 2n bits.
3 Pseudorandom Functions With One Permutation Call
We will show that any pseudorandom function F that makes only one per-
mutation call and has linear pre- and post-processing functions cannot achieve
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Fig. 2: Function F1 based on two keysK1 andK2, and making one public random
permutations evaluation.
security beyond the birthday bound. Let n ∈ N, and let pi ∈ Perm(n). Let
L1 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n and L2 : {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
be any two linear mappings (that only consist of modular addition and scalar
multiplication). Let F1: {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be the function of Figure 2.
We will show that for independent K1,K2, there exists a distinguisher that can
distinguish any such function from random using at most 3 · 2n/2 construction
queries and at most 3 · 2n/2 primitive queries. Note that modular addition of
the input M to the output C does not influence the security of F1, as the
distinguisher knows the exact value of M .
Proposition 1. Let n ∈ N, and consider the function F1: {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n →
{0, 1}n of Figure 2 based on permutation pi $←− Perm(n) and two keys K1,K2 $←−
{0, 1}n, for any linear L1, L2. There exists a distinguisher D making at most
3 · 2n/2 construction queries and at most 3 · 2n/2 primitive queries such that
AdvprfF1(D) ≥ 1−
1
e
. (3)
Proof. As the mixing functions L1, L2 are linear, we can represent these as
L1 =
(
l11 l12
)
L2 =
(
l21 l22 l23
)
,
where L1, L2 are evaluated on (K1,M) and (K2, x, y), respectively.
The distinguisher’s advantage satisfies
AdvprfF1(D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DF1pi,pi± = 1]− Pr [Dϕ,pi± = 1]∣∣∣ .
Subcase l12 = 0 ∨ l23 = 0. In this case, the input to or the output of the
permutation pi is not related to M or C. When l12 = 0, the distinguisher selects
arbitrary M,M ′ to obtain C,C ′. If the event C = C ′ happens, then output 1;
otherwise, output 0. This gives a distinguisher in two construction queries with
a success probability of 1− 1/2n. Similar for l23 = 0.
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Subcase l11 = 0 ∨ l21 = 0. In this case, the input to or the output of the
permutation pi is independent of the keys. When l11 = 0, the distinguisher selects
arbitrary x, x′ to obtain y, y′. Then, it puts M = l−112 x and M
′ = l−112 x
′ to obtain
C and C ′. If the event A happens, then output 1; otherwise, output 0:
A =
{
C ⊕ C ′ = l23y ⊕ l23y′ if l22 = 0 ,
C ⊕ C ′ = l23y ⊕ l23y′ ⊕ l22x⊕ l22x′ if l22 6= 0 .
This gives a distinguisher in two construction and two primitive queries with a
success probability of 1− 1/2n. Similar for l21 = 0.
Subcase l22 = 0. In this case, the construction is a generalization of the Even-
Mansour cipher. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world
oracle (F1pi, pi) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, pi) with significant probability. D
makes 2n/2 construction queries and no primitive queries and operates as follows.
For j = 1, . . . , 2n/2, the distinguisher selects arbitrary M (j)’s to obtain C(j). If
we have C(j¯) 6= C(j¯′) for all query indices j¯ 6= j¯′ , then output 1; otherwise,
output 0.
In the real world, F1 behaves as a PRP, and thus Pr
[
DF1pi,pi± = 1
]
= 1. For
the ideal world, we have
Pr
[
Dϕ,pi± = 1
]
= Pr
[
∩j,j′ C(j) 6= C(j′)
]
≤ 1−
(
1− e−(q2) 12n
)
= e−(
q
2)
1
2n ,
where q = 2n/2.
Subcase l11, l12, l21, l22, l23 6= 0. This is the most general subcase. We will
construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle (F1pi, pi) from
the ideal world oracle (ϕ, pi) with significant probability. The distinguisher D
returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real world oracle and returns
0 otherwise. D makes 3 · 2n/2 construction queries, and 3 · 2n/2 primitive queries
to pi in total and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query M (j) = l−112 (〈j〉n/2 ‖ 0n/2) to obtain C(j), query
M∗(j) = l−112 (〈j〉n/2 ‖ 0n/2−11) to obtain C∗(j), and M∗∗(j) = l−112 (〈j〉n/2 ‖
0n/2−210) to obtain C∗∗(j);
(ii) For i = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query x(i) = 0n/2 ‖ 〈i〉n/2 to obtain y(i). Define
(x∗(i), y∗(i)) and (x∗∗(i), y∗∗(i)) as the tuples that satisfy x∗(i) = x(i)⊕0n−11
and x∗∗(i) = x(i) ⊕ 0n−210, respectively;
(iii) If there are two query indices j¯, i¯ such that C(j¯)⊕C∗(j¯) = l22(x(¯i)⊕x∗(¯i))⊕
l23(y
(¯i)⊕y∗(¯i)) and C(j¯)⊕C∗∗(j¯) = l22(x(¯i)⊕x∗∗(¯i))⊕ l23(y(¯i)⊕y∗∗(¯i)), then
output 1; otherwise, output 0.
In the real world, there is exactly one (j¯, i¯) such that l−111 (l12M
(j¯) ⊕ x(¯i)) = K1,
leading to
C(j¯) = l22x
(¯i) ⊕ l23y(¯i) ⊕ l21K2 .
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In addition, also l−111 (l12M
∗(j¯) ⊕ x∗(¯i)) = K1 and l−111 (l12M∗∗(j¯) ⊕ x∗∗(¯i)) = K1,
leading to
C∗(j¯) = l22x∗(¯i) ⊕ l23y∗(¯i) ⊕ l21K2 ,
C∗∗(j¯) = l22x∗∗(¯i) ⊕ l23y∗∗(¯i) ⊕ l21K2 .
The equations imply that
Aj¯,¯i : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗(j¯) = l22(x(¯i) ⊕ x∗(¯i))⊕ l23(y(¯i) ⊕ y∗(¯i)) ,
Bj¯,¯i : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗∗(j¯) = l22(x(¯i) ⊕ x∗∗(¯i))⊕ l23(y(¯i) ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)) ,
and thus that Pr
[
DF1pi,pi± = 1
]
= 1.
For the ideal world, we have
Pr
[
Dϕ,pi± = 1
]
= Pr [∪j,i Aj,i ∧Bj,i] ≤ qp
22n
,
where q = p = 2n/2. uunionsq
4 Sum of Even-Mansour
We consider the Sum of Even-Mansour construction, called SoEM, that com-
bines the sum of permutations of Bellare et al. [7] with the Even-Mansour ci-
pher [32]. Let n ∈ N, and let pi1, pi2 ∈ Perm(n). One can consider a generic
construction SoEM: {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as
SoEM(K1,K2,M) = pi1(M ⊕K1)⊕K1 ⊕ pi2(M ⊕K2)⊕K2 . (4)
See also Figure 3. We will consider the construction for three variants: SoEM1 for
the case where pi1 and pi2 are identical in Section 4.1, SoEM21 for the case where
pi1, pi2 are independent but K1 and K2 are identical (so the key space is n bits) in
Section 4.2, and SoEM22 for the case where pi1, pi2 are independent and K1,K2
are independent in Section 4.3. Note that for SoEM21, we will have to make a
slight adjustment, because by simply putting K1 = K2 in above equation, the
addition of the keys at the end of the permutation calls will cancel out. We will
detail this in Section 4.2.
4.1 One Permutation
We show that SoEM1, where pi1 = pi2 (but no a priori restriction on K1,K2 is
imposed) cannot achieve security beyond the birthday bound.
Proposition 2. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM1: {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on permutation pi
$←− Perm(n) and two keys K1,K2 $←− {0, 1}n. There exists
a distinguisher D making 4 · 2n/2 construction queries such that
AdvprfSoEM1(D) ≥ 1−
1
2n
. (5)
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Fig. 3: Encryption of SoEM based on two keys K1 and K2, and with pi1 and pi2
two public random permutations.
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle
(SoEM1pi, pi±) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, pi±) with significant probability.
The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with the real
world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 4 · 2n/2 construction queries and
no primitive queries and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query M (j) = 〈j〉n/2 ‖ 0n/2 to obtain C(j), and query
M∗(j) = M (j) ⊕ 0n−11 to obtain C∗(j);
(ii) For j′ = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query M (j
′) = 0n/2 ‖ 〈j′〉n/2 to obtain C(j′). Define
(M∗(j
′), C∗(j
′)) as the tuple that satisfies M∗(j
′) = M (j
′) ⊕ 0n−11;
(iii) If there are two query indices j¯, j¯′ such that C(j¯) = C(j¯′) and C∗(j¯) = C∗(j¯′),
then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
The distinguisher’s advantage satisfies
AdvprfSoEM1(D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DSoEM1piK1,K2 ,pi± = 1]− Pr [Dϕ,pi± = 1]∣∣∣ .
In the real world, there is exactly one (j¯, j¯′) such that M (j¯)⊕M (j¯′) = K1⊕K2,
leading to C(j¯) = C(j¯
′) in the real world. In addition, also M∗(j¯) ⊕M∗(j¯′) =
K1 ⊕K2, and C∗(j¯) = C∗(j¯′) as well. Thus, Pr
[
DSoEM1piK1,K2 ,pi± = 1
]
= 1.
For the ideal world, we have
Pr
[
Dϕ,pi± = 1
]
= Pr
[
∪j,j′ C(j) = C(j′) ∧ C∗(j) = C∗(j′)
]
≤ q
2
22n
,
where q = 2n/2. uunionsq
Note that the cost of step (i) in the attack can be reduced by only querying M∗(j)
for j = j¯, but this would complicate the simple description of the distinguisher.
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4.2 Two Permutations, One Key
Let n ∈ N. Let pi1, pi2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be two independent random permuta-
tions. We define SoEM construction based on pi1, pi2 and using a single key K as
follows:
SoEM21pi1,pi2(K,M) = pi1(M ⊕K)⊕ pi2(M ⊕K)⊕K , (6)
and we show that SoEM21 cannot achieve beyond the birthday bound security.
Proposition 3. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM21: {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on two permutations pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n) and one key K $←− {0, 1}n. There
exists a distinguisher D making 3 · 2n/2 construction queries, 3 · 2n/2 primitive
queries to pi1, and 3 · 2n/2 primitive queries to pi2 such that
AdvprfSoEM21(D) ≥ 1−
1
2n
. (7)
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle
(SoEM21pi1,pi2K , pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 ) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 ) with significant
probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with
the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 3 · 2n/2 construction
queries, 3 ·2n/2 primitive queries to pi1, and 3 ·2n/2 primitive query to pi2 in total
and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query M (j) = 〈j〉n/2 ‖ 0n/2 to obtain C(j), query
M∗(j) = 〈j〉n/2 ‖ 0n/2−11 to obtain C∗(j), and query M∗∗(j) = 〈j〉n/2 ‖
0n/2−210 to obtain C∗∗(j);
(ii) For i = 1, . . . , 2n/2, query x(i) = 0n/2 ‖ 〈i〉n/2 to pi1 and pi2 to obtain y(i)1
and y
(i)
2 . Define (x
∗(i), y∗(i)1 ) and (x
∗∗(i), y∗∗(i)1 ) as the tuples that satisfy
x∗(i) = x(i) ⊕ 0n−11 and x∗∗(i) = x(i) ⊕ 0n−210, respectively, and similarly
for the queries to pi2;
(iii) If there are two query indices j¯, i¯ such that C(j¯) ⊕ C∗(j¯) = y(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗(¯i)1 ⊕
y
(¯i)
2 ⊕ y∗(¯i)2 and C(j¯) ⊕ C∗∗(j¯) = y(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y(¯i)2 ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)2 , then output 1;
otherwise, output 0.
The distinguisher’s advantage satisfies
AdvprfSoEM21(D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DSoEM21pi1,pi2 ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1]− Pr [Dϕ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1]∣∣∣ .
In the real world, there is exactly one (j¯, i¯) such that M (j¯) ⊕ x(¯i) = K, leading
to
C(j¯) = y
(¯i)
1 ⊕ y(¯i)2 ⊕K .
In addition, also M∗(j¯) ⊕ x∗(¯i) = K and M∗∗(j¯) ⊕ x∗∗(¯i) = K, leading to
C∗(j¯) = y∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗(¯i)2 ⊕K ,
C∗∗(j¯) = y∗∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)2 ⊕K .
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The equations imply that
Aj¯,¯i : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗(j¯) = y(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y(¯i)2 ⊕ y∗(¯i)2 ,
Bj¯,¯i : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗∗(j¯) = y(¯i)1 ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y(¯i)2 ⊕ y∗∗(¯i)2 ,
and thus that Pr
[
DSoEM21pi1,pi2 ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1
]
= 1.
For the ideal world, we have
Pr
[
Dϕ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1
]
= Pr [∪j,i Aj,i ∧Bj,i] ≤ qp
22n
,
where q = p = 2n/2. uunionsq
4.3 Two Permutations, Two Keys
We prove that SoEM22 for independent pi1, pi2 and independent K1,K2 is secure
up to attack complexity 22n/3. We also demonstrate an attack matching this
bound.
Theorem 1. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM22: {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on two permutations pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n) and two keys K1,K2 $←− {0, 1}n.
For any distinguisher D making at most q construction queries, at most p prim-
itive queries to pi±1 and p primitive queries to pi
±
2 , we have
AdvprfSoEM22(D) ≤
q(p+ q)2
22n
+
3qp2
22n
. (8)
The proof is given in Section 6.3.
Proposition 4. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoEM22: {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on two permutations pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n) and two keys K1,K2 $←− {0, 1}n.
There exists a distinguisher D making 4 ·22n/3 construction queries, and 4 ·22n/3
primitive queries to pi1 and 4 · 22n/3 primitive queries to pi2 such that
AdvprfSoEM22(D) ≥ 1−
1
e
− 1
2n
. (9)
Proof. We will construct a distinguisher D distinguishing the real world oracle
(SoEM22pi1,pi2K1,K2 , pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 ) from the ideal world oracle (ϕ, pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 ) with significant
probability. The distinguisher D returns 1 if it guesses that it is interacting with
the real world oracle and returns 0 otherwise. D makes 4 · 22n/3 construction
queries, 4 · 22n/3 primitive queries to pi1, and 4 · 22n/3 primitive query to pi2 in
total and operates as follows.
(i) For j = 1, . . . , 22n/3, query M (j) = 〈j〉2n/3 ‖ 0n/3 to obtain C(j), query
M∗(j) = 〈j〉2n/3 ‖ 0n/3−11 to obtain C∗(j), query M∗∗(j) = 〈j〉2n/3 ‖
0n/3−210 to obtain C∗∗(j), and query M∗∗∗(j) = 〈j〉2n/3 ‖ 0n/3−211 to
obtain C∗∗∗(j);
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(ii) For i = 1, . . . , 22n/3, query u(i) = 0n/3 ‖ 〈i〉2n/3 to pi1 to obtain v(i). Define
(u∗(i), v∗(i)), (u∗∗(i), v∗∗(i)), and (u∗∗∗(i), v∗∗∗(i)) as the tuples that satisfy
u∗(i) = u(i) ⊕ 0n−11, u∗∗(i) = u(i) ⊕ 0n−210, and u∗∗∗(i) = u(i) ⊕ 0n−211,
respectively;
(iii) For i′ = 1, . . . , 22n/3, query x(i
′) at random to obtain y(i
′), query x∗(i
′) =
x(i
′)⊕0n−11 to obtain y∗(i′), query x∗∗(i′) = x(i¯′)⊕0n−210 to obtain y∗∗(i′),
and query x∗∗∗(i
′) = x(i¯
′) ⊕ 0n−211 to obtain y∗∗∗(i′);
(iv) If there are three query indices j¯, i¯, i¯′ such that C(j¯)⊕C∗(j¯) = v(¯i)⊕v∗(¯i)⊕
y(i¯
′)⊕y∗(i¯′), C(j¯)⊕C∗∗(j¯) = v(¯i)⊕v∗∗(¯i)⊕y(i¯′)⊕y∗∗(i¯′) and C(j¯)⊕C∗∗∗(j¯) =
v(¯i) ⊕ v∗∗∗(¯i) ⊕ y(i¯′) ⊕ y∗∗∗(i¯′), then output 1; otherwise, output 0.
The distinguisher’s advantage satisfies
AdvprfSoEM22(D) =
∣∣∣Pr [DSoEM22pi1,pi2 ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1]− Pr [Dϕ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1]∣∣∣ .
Put q = p = 22n/3. First consider the real world. Define IK1 = {(j, i) : M (j) ⊕
u(i) = K1}, and note that |IK1 | = 2n/3. We denote by Ej,i′ the event that
M (j) ⊕ x(i′) = K2, for fixed j, i′ where (j, ·) ∈ IK1 . For each j, i′, we have
Pr [Ej,i′ ] = 1/2
n, and we obtain from the union bound:
Pr [∪j,i′ Ej,i′ ] ≤ 2
n/3p
2n
. (10)
For the lower bound, we denote by Dj the event that a fixed j with (j, ·) ∈ IK1
satisfies M (j)⊕x(i′) 6= K2 for all i′. Note that the Dj ’s are mutually independent
for different j, and the probability of any Dj is
Pr[Dj ] =
2n − p
2n
= 1− p
2n
.
The probability of M (j) ⊕ x(i′) 6= K2 for all j, i′ can now be computed as
1− Pr [∪j,i′ Ej,i′ ] =
2n/3∏
j=1
Pr[Dj ] =
2n/3∏
j=1
(
1− p
2n
)
.
As p/2n ≤ 1, we can use the inequality 1 − x ≤ e−x for each term of above
expression, and find an upper bound
2n/3∏
j=1
e−
p
2n = e−
2n/3p
2n .
Putting all this together we get the lower bound
Pr [∪j,i′ Ej,i′ ] ≥ 1− e−
2n/3p
2n . (11)
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Note that if there exist (j¯, i¯) ∈ IK1 and i¯′ such that M (j¯) ⊕ x(i¯′) = K2, we also
have that
C(j¯) ⊕ v(¯i) ⊕ y(i¯′) = K1 ⊕K2 . (12)
We in addition have that (M (j¯) ⊕∆)⊕ (u(¯i) ⊕∆) = K1 and that (M (j¯) ⊕∆)⊕
(x(i¯
′) ⊕∆) = K2 for any ∆ ∈ {0, 1}n. Due to our definition of M∗∗(j¯), M∗∗∗(j¯),
u∗∗(j¯), u∗∗∗(j¯), x∗∗(j¯), and x∗∗∗(j¯),, we thus obtain that also
C∗(j¯) ⊕ v∗(¯i) ⊕ y∗(i¯′) = K1 ⊕K2 ,
C∗∗(j¯) ⊕ v∗∗(¯i) ⊕ y∗∗(i¯′) = K1 ⊕K2 ,
C∗∗∗(j¯) ⊕ v∗∗∗(¯i) ⊕ y∗∗∗(i¯′) = K1 ⊕K2 .
Combining these three equations with (12), we can conclude that under the
premise that (12) holds, the following three events
Aj¯,¯i,i¯′ : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗(j¯) = v(¯i) ⊕ v∗(¯i)1 ⊕ y(i¯
′) ⊕ y∗(i¯′) ,
Bj¯,¯i,i¯′ : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗∗(j¯) = v(¯i) ⊕ v∗∗(¯i) ⊕ y(i¯′) ⊕ y∗∗(i¯′) ,
Cj¯,¯i,i¯′ : C
(j¯) ⊕ C∗∗∗(j¯) = v(¯i) ⊕ v∗∗∗(¯i) ⊕ y(i¯′) ⊕ y∗∗∗(i¯′) ,
are satisfied in the real world. Therefore, for the real world, we can conclude the
following:
Pr
[
DSoEM22pi1,pi2 ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1
]
= Pr [∪j,i′ Ej,i′ ] + Pr [∪j,i,i′ Aj,i,i′ ∧Bj,i,i′ ∧ Cj,i,i′ | ∩j,i′ ¬Ej,i′ ] · Pr [∩j,i′ ¬Ej,i′ ] .
From (10) and (11), we obtain
Pr
[
DSoEM22pi1,pi2 ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1
]
≥ 1− e− 2
n/3p
2n +
qp2
23n
(
1− 2
n/3p
2n
)
= 1− e− 2
n/3p
2n ,
where p = 22n/3.
For the ideal world, we have
Pr
[
Dϕ,pi±1 ,pi±2 = 1
]
= Pr [∪j,i,i′ Aj,i,i′ ∧Bj,i,i′ ∧ Cj,i,i′ ] ≤ qp
2
23n
,
where q = p = 22n/3. uunionsq
5 Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers
Inspired by the result on SoEM22, we consider a sequential evaluation, which
we call the Sum of Key Alternating Ciphers (SoKAC). It reminds of the EDMD
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construction of Mennink and Neves [50] instantiated with Even-Mansour, but
it is not quite the same. Let n ∈ N, and let pi1, pi2 ∈ Perm(n). We define the
generic construction SoKAC: {0, 1}2n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n as
SoKAC(K1,K2,M) = pi2(pi1(M ⊕K1)⊕K2)⊕K1 ⊕ pi1(M ⊕K1)⊕K2 , (13)
See also Figure 4. We will consider the construction for two variants: SoKAC1
for the case where pi1 = pi2 are identical in Section 5.1, and SoKAC21 for the
case where pi1, pi2 are independent but K1 = K2 are identical (so the key space
is n bits) in Section 5.2. As before, for SoKAC21, we will have to make a slight
adjustment, because by simply putting K1 = K2 in above equation, the addition
of the keys at the end of the permutation calls will cancel out. We will detail
this in Section 5.2.
+
K1
pi1 +
K2
pi2 +
K1
M u v x y C
Fig. 4: Encryption of SoKAC based on two keys K1 and K2, and with pi1 and pi2
two public random permutations.
5.1 One Permutation
We show that SoKAC1, where pi1 = pi2 (but no a priori restriction on K1,K2 is
imposed), cannot achieve security beyond the birthday bound.
Proposition 5. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoKAC1 : {0, 1}2n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on permutation pi
$←− Perm(n) and two keys K1,K2 $←− {0, 1}n. There exists
a distinguisher D making 3 · 2n/2 construction queries such that
AdvprfSoKAC1(D) ≥ 1−
1
2n
. (14)
Proof. The attack is identical to that of SoEM1 of Proposition 2, and henceforth
omitted. uunionsq
5.2 Two Permutations, One Key
Let n ∈ N. Let pi1, pi2 : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be two independent random permuta-
tions. We define SoKAC construction based on pi1, pi2 and using a single key K
as follows:
SoKAC21pi1,pi2(K,M) = pi2(pi1(M ⊕K)⊕K)⊕ pi1(M ⊕K)⊕K , (15)
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and we show that SoKAC21 is secure up to attack complexity 22n/3. We also
demonstrate an attack matching this bound.
Theorem 2. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoKAC21: {0, 1}n × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on two permutations pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n) and one key K $←− {0, 1}n. For
any distinguisher D making at most q construction queries, at most p primitive
queries to pi±1 and p primitive queries to pi
±
2 , we have
AdvprfSoKAC21(D) ≤
q(p+ q)2
22n
+
2
2n
+
qp2
22n
+
2p2
√
qp
22n
+
3
√
nqp2
2n
+
4
√
qp2
2n
.
(16)
The proof is given in Section 6.4.
Proposition 6. Let n ∈ N, and consider SoKAC21: {0, 1}n×{0, 1}n → {0, 1}n
based on two permutations pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n) and one key K $←− {0, 1}n. There
exists a distinguisher D making 4 ·22n/3 construction queries, and 4 ·22n/3 prim-
itive queries to pi1 and 4 · 22n/3 primitive queries to pi2 such that
AdvprfSoKAC21(D) ≥ 1−
1
e
− 1
2n
. (17)
Proof. The attack is identical to that of SoEM22 of Proposition 4, and henceforth
omitted. uunionsq
6 Security Proofs
The security proofs of SoEM22 and SoKAC21 are given in Sections 6.3 and 6.4.
The proofs are performed using Patarin’s H-coefficient technique, which we will
recap in Section 6.1. The proof of SoKAC21 relies on the sum-capture lemma,
which we revisit in Section 6.2. The analysis for good transcripts resembles ideas
of the first iteration in Patarin’s mirror theory, but difficulties appear in the fact
that the distinguisher can make direct queries to the permutations pi1 and pi2.
6.1 Patarin’s H-Coefficient Technique
In this work, we use the H-coefficient technique by Patarin [54, 56], but we will
follow the modernization of Chen and Steinberger [21].
Let pi1, pi2, . . . , pir
$←− Perm(n), and ϕ $←− Func(n). Let K $←− {0, 1}k, and
F : {0, 1}k × {0, 1}n → {0, 1}n be a pseudorandom function based on public
random permutations pi1, pi2, . . . , pir. We consider a deterministic distinguisher D
that has query access to either the real world oracle O = (Fpi1,...,pirK , pi±1 , , . . . , pi±r )
or the ideal world oracle P = (ϕ, pi±1 , . . . , pi±r ). The distinguisher’s goal is to
distinguish both worlds and we denote by
Adv(D) = ∣∣Pr [DO = 1]− Pr [DP = 1]∣∣
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its advantage. We summarize all query-response tuples learned by D during its
interaction with its oracle O or P in a transcript τ . We denote by XO (resp.
XP) the probability distribution of transcripts when interacting with O (resp.
P). We call a transcript τ ∈ T attainable if Pr[XP = τ ] > 0, or in other words
if the transcript τ can be obtained from an interaction with P.
Lemma 1 (H-coefficient Technique). Consider a deterministic distinguisher
D. Define a partition T = Tgood ∪ Tbad, where Tgood is the subset of T which
contains all the “good” transcripts and Tbad is the subset with all the “bad”
transcripts. Let 0 ≤  ≤ 1 be such that for all τ ∈ Tgood:
Pr(XO = τ)
Pr(XP = τ)
≥ 1−  . (18)
Then, we have Adv(D) ≤ + Pr[XP ∈ Tbad].
6.2 Sum-Capture Lemma
We use the sum-capture lemma [20, 25, 51], which is built upon the work of
Babai [2] and Steinberger [63]. Such results typically state that for a random
subset Z of {0, 1}n of size p, the quantity
µ(Z,A,B) = |{(z, a, b) ∈ Z ×A×B : z = a⊕ b}|
is at most around p · |A| · |B| /2n for any possible choice of A and B, except with
negligible probability. In our setting, Z will consist of query-response tuples from
a permutation, i.e., Z consists of values u(i)⊕v(i) where {(u(1), v(1)), . . . , (u(p), v(p))}
is a permutation transcript. We will appeal to the sum-capture theorem by Chen
et al. [20].
Lemma 2 (Sum-Capture Lemma). Let n, p ∈ N such that 9n ≤ p ≤ 2n−1.
Let pi
$←− Perm(n), let {(u(1), v(1)), . . . , (u(p), v(p))} be p tuples of pi, and let Z =
{(u(1) ⊕ v(1)), . . . , (u(p) ⊕ v(p))}. For any two subsets A,B ⊆ {0, 1}n, we have
Pr
[
µ(Z,A,B) ≥ p |A| |B|
2n
+
2p2
√|A| |B|
2n
+ 3
√
np |A| |B|
]
≤ 2
2n
.
6.3 Proof of Theorem 1 on SoEM22
Let K = (K1,K2)
$←− {0, 1}2n, pi1, pi2 $←− Perm(n), and ϕ $←− Func(n). Consider
any distinguisher D that has access to three oracles: (SoEM22pi1,pi2K , pi±1 , pi±2 ) in
the real world or (ϕ, pi±1 , pi
±
2 ) in the ideal world. We assume D is computational
unbounded and deterministic. The distinguisher makes q construction queries
to O0 ∈ {SoEM22pi1,pi2K , ϕ}, and these are summarized in a transcript of the
form τ0 = {(M (1), C(1)), . . . , (M (q), C(q))}. It also makes p primitive queries
to O1 = pi±1 and p primitive queries to O2 = pi±2 , and like before, these are
respectively summarized in transcripts τ1 = {(u(1), v(1)), . . . , (u(p), v(p))} and
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τ2 = {(x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(p), y(p))}. We assume that τ0, τ1, and τ2 do not contain
duplicate elements. After D’s interaction with the oracles, but before it outputs
its decision, we disclose the keys K1,K2 to the distinguisher. In real world, these
are the keys used in the construction. In the ideal world K1,K2 are dummy
keys that are drawn uniformly at random. The complete view is denoted τ =
(τ0, τ1, τ2,K1,K2).
Bad Events. We say that τ ∈ Tbad if and only if there exists a construction
query (M (j), C(j)) ∈ τ0 and primitive queries (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1 and (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈
τ2 such that one of the following conditions holds:
bad1 : M
(j) ⊕ u(i) = K1 ∧ M (j) ⊕ x(i′) = K2 , (19)
bad2 : M
(j) ⊕ u(i) = K1 ∧ C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕ y(i′) = K1 ⊕K2 , (20)
bad3 : M
(j) ⊕ x(i′) = K2 ∧ C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕ y(i′) = K1 ⊕K2 . (21)
Note that any attainable transcript τ for which τ /∈ Tbad, implies that τ is a
good transcript.
We give an informal explanation of the definition of the bad event. In the
real world, every construction query j induces exactly one evaluation (u(j), v(j))
of the underlying public permutation pi1, and exactly one evaluation (x
(j), y(j))
of the underlying public permutation pi2. These two queries naturally satisfy
M (j) ⊕ u(j) = K1 ,
M (j) ⊕ x(j) = K2 ,
C(j) ⊕ v(j) ⊕ y(j) = K1 ⊕K2 .
Clearly, u(j) and x(j) are fixed by M (j), K1, and K2, but there is “freedom” in the
value v(j)⊕ y(j). If it happens to be that the distinguisher queried u(j), i.e., that
(u(j), v(j)) ∈ τ1, it consequently fixes the tuple (x(j), y(j)) for pi2. However, in
the ideal world, there is no such dependency. This means that if the adversary
had queried u(j) = M (j) ⊕ K1 to pi1 and x(j) = M (j) ⊕ K2 to pi2, with high
probability the third equation would not hold. An identical reasoning applies for
the case where the distinguisher happened to have set any other two out of three
equations.
Pr[XP ∈ Tbad]. We want to bound the probability that an ideal world tran-
script τ satisfies either of (19)-(21). Therefore, the probability that τ ∈ Tbad is
given by
Pr[τ ∈ Tbad] ≤ Pr[bad1] + Pr[bad2] + Pr[bad3] .
We consider the first bad event bad1. For any possible construction query (M
(j), C(j)) ∈
τ0, any possible pi1 primitive query (u
(i), v(i)), and any possible pi2 primitive
query (x(i
′), y(i
′)), the only randomness in the first equation is K1 and the only
randomness in the second equation is K2. This means that the probabilities that
17
each of the equation holds in bad1 are independent of each other. By the fact
that the keys K = (K1,K2)
$←− {0, 1}2n are dummy keys generated indepen-
dently of τ0, τ1 and τ2, the probability that bad1 holds for fixed j, i, i
′ is 1/22n.
Summed over all q possible construction queries, p possible pi1 primitive queries,
and p possible pi2 primitive queries, we have
Pr[bad1] ≤ qp
2
22n
.
For the second bad event bad2, note that we can replace K1 in the second
equation by M (j) ⊕ u(i). Hereby, the only randomness in the first equation is
K1 and the only randomness in the second equation is K2. The probabilities
that each of the equation holds in bad2 are independent of each other. Again,
summing over all the construction and the primitive queries, we have
Pr[bad2] ≤ qp
2
22n
.
The same reasoning applies for bad3. Summing the three probabilities, we get
Pr[τ ∈ Tbad] ≤ 3qp
2
22n
. (22)
Pr[XO = τ ]/Pr[XP = τ ]. Consider an attainable transcript τ ∈ Tgood. To
compute Pr[XO = τ ] and Pr[XP = τ ], it suffices to compute the probability of
oracles that could result in view τ . Denote by allO the set of all oracles in the
real world, and by compO(τ) the fraction of them compatible with τ , we see that
Pr[XO = τ ] = |compO(τ)| / |allO|. Similarly we have allP and compP(τ) for the
ideal world. We obtain
Pr[XO = τ ]
Pr[XP = τ ]
=
|compO(τ)| · |allP |
|allO| · |compP(τ)|
. (23)
For the real world O, we have |allO| = 22n · (2n!)2, which is equal to the
number of possible keys K = (K1,K2) times the number of possible public
random permutations pi1 and pi2. Similarly, for the ideal world P, we have
|allP | = 22n · 2n2n(2n!)2. The first term corresponds to the number of ran-
domly drawn keys, the second term is the number of possible random functions
ϕ ∈ Func(n), and the last term the number of possible public random permuta-
tions pi1 and pi2. For the computation of the number of oracles compatible with τ
in the ideal world, we see that there are 2n(2
n−q) random functions ϕ ∈ Func(n)
compliant with τ0, (2
n − p)! public random permutations pi1 compliant with τ1,
and (2n − p)! public random permutations pi2 compliant with τ2. We find
|compP(τ)| = 2n(2
n−q) · (2n − p)!2 .
From (23), we have
Pr[XO = τ ]
Pr[XP = τ ]
=
|compO(τ)| · 22n2n2
n
(2n!)2
22n(2n!)2 · (2n(2n−q))(2n − p)!2 =
|compO(τ)| · 2nq
(2n − p)!2 . (24)
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What remains is the computation of the number of oracles compatible with τ in
the real world. As defined by the bad events, a transcript τ is bad if we get both
the same input or output to pi1, and the same input or output to pi2. This means
that for any τ ∈ Tgood, a construction query collides with at most one query in
τ1 ∪ τ2. We conclude this fact in the following claim:
Claim. For τ ∈ Tgood, any construction query (M (j), C(j)) ∈ τ0 collides with
at most one primitive query (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1 and at most one primitive query
(x(i
′), y(i
′)) ∈ τ2, but never with both a τ1 and τ2 query.
We will use this claim to re-group the transcripts τ0, τ1, and τ2 into three new
transcripts τnew0 , τ
new
1 , and τ
new
2 . We initially define τ
new
0 = τ0, τ
new
1 = τ1 and
τnew2 = τ2. The trick will be to consider each individual construction query
(M (j), C(j)), and to operate as follows:
– if M (j)⊕K1 = u(i) for some i, then remove (M (j), C(j)) from τnew0 , and add
(x, y) = (M (j) ⊕K2, C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕K1 ⊕K2) to τnew2 ;
– if M (j) ⊕ K2 = x(i′) for some i′, then remove (M (j), C(j)) from τnew0 , and
add (u, v) = (M (j) ⊕K1, C(j) ⊕ y(i′) ⊕K1 ⊕K2) to τnew1 .
Note that any good transcript will have to meet ¬bad1 ∧ ¬bad2 ∧ ¬bad3. We
know that if a construction query (M (j), C(j)) collides with (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1, then
M (j)⊕K2 cannot be a valid x(i′) value because of ¬bad1, and C(j)⊕v(i)⊕K1⊕K2
cannot be a valid y(i
′) value because of ¬bad2, for any (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈ τ2. Similarly
for τnew1 . This way, we will end up with soundly defined τ
new
1 and τ
new
2 for pi1 and
pi2, and a set of construction queries τ
new
0 that does not collide with any tuple in
τnew1 or τ
new
2 . Let s2, s1 ≤ p be the number of construction queries that collides
with (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1 resp. (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈ τ2. The number of elements in the new
transcripts τnew1 and τ
new
2 are equal to p + s2 resp. p + s1, and the number of
construction queries that remains in τnew0 is equal to q
′ = q − s1 − s2.
The two sets of transcripts, τnew1 and τ
new
2 , define exactly p+s2 input-output
tuples for pi1 and exactly p+ s1 input-output tuples for pi2. What remains is the
counting of the number of permutations pi1, pi2 that satisfy these p + s2 resp.
p+ s1 tuples, and that could give the remaining transcript τ
new
0 .
For a given transcript τnew0 of q
′ elements, our goal is to count the number
of n-bit permutations pi1 : D1 → R1 with |D1| = |R1| = 2n − p − s2, and the
number of n-bit permutations pi2 : D2 → R2 with |D2| = |R2| = 2n− p− s1. We
define Vout = {0, 1}n\R1 as the set of range values of pi1 that are not permitted
(basically these are the v values from τnew1 , τ
new
2 ) and similarly for Yout.
For α = 0, . . . , q′ − 1, define λα+1 as the number of solutions
{v(1), . . . , v(α+1); y(1), . . . , y(α+1)}
that satisfy:
(1) {v(1), . . . , v(α); y(1), . . . , y(α)} satisfy λα;
(2) v(α+1) ⊕ y(α+1) = C(α+1) ⊕K1 ⊕K2;
(3) v(α+1) /∈ {v(1), . . . , v(α)} ∪ Vout;
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(4) y(α+1) /∈ {y(1), . . . , y(α)} ∪ Yout.
Our goal is to derive a recursive formula for λα+1 that depends on λα, such that
a lower bound can be found for the expression λα+1/λα. Note that, by definition,
|compO(τ)| = λq′(2n − p− s2 − q′)!(2n − p− s1 − q′)! . (25)
Processing from (24), we obtain
Pr[XO = τ ]
Pr[XP = τ ]
=
λq′(2
n − p− s2 − q′)!(2n − p− s1 − q′)! · 2nq
(2n − p)!2 . (26)
We will derive a lower bound for λα+1/λα. Define by B(1,2) the set of solutions
that only comply with (1) and (2), with no side condition from (3) and (4).
Define by B(3:i) the set of solutions that comply with (1) and (2) of above,
and satisfy ¬(3 : i) for i = 1, . . . , α + |Vout|. It means that any solution in this
case satisfies (1) and (2), and v(α+1) ∈ {v(1), . . . , v(α)} ∪ Vout (nothing is said
about y(α+1) except for property (2)). Similarly for B(4 : i). By the principle of
inclusion-exclusion, we obtain
λα+1 =
∣∣B(1,2)∣∣−
∣∣∣∣∣∣
α+|Vout|⋃
i=1
B(3:i) ∪
α+|Yout|⋃
i=1
B(4:i′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≥ ∣∣B(1,2)∣∣− α+|Vout|∑
i=1
∣∣B(3:i)∣∣− α+|Yout|∑
i=1
∣∣B(4:i)∣∣+ α+|Yout|∑
i′=1
α+|Vout|∑
i=1
∣∣B(3:i) ∩B(4:i′)∣∣
≥ 2n · λα −
α+|Vout|∑
i=1
λα −
α+|Yout|∑
i=1
λα +
α+|Yout|∑
i′=1
α+|Vout|∑
i=1
∣∣B(3:i) ∩B(4:i′)∣∣ .
By the fact that
α+|Yout|∑
i′=1
α+|Vout|∑
i=1
∣∣B(3:i) ∩B(4:i′)∣∣ ≥ 0 ,
we get
λα+1 ≥ 2nλα − (α+ p+ s2)λα − (α+ p+ s1)λα .
Thus, we have obtained
λα+1
λα
≥ 2n − 2α− 2p− s1 − s2 , (27)
with λ0 = 1.
Processing from (26), we obtain
(26) =
s1−1∏
i=1
2n
(2n − p− i) ·
s2−1∏
i=1
2n
(2n − p− i)
·
q′−1∏
i=0
λi+1
λi
· 2
n
(2n − p− s2 − i)(2n − p− s1 − i) . (28)
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Using that p, s1, s2 ≤ 2n, and combining (27) with (28), we obtain
(28) ≥
q′−1∏
i=0
λi+1
λi
· 2
n
(2n − p− s2 − i)(2n − p− s1 − i)
≥
q′−1∏
i=0
(2n − 2i− 2p− s1 − s2)2n
(2n − p− s2 − i)(2n − p− s1 − i)
=
q′−1∏
i=0
(
1− (p+ s2 + p)(p+ s1 + p)
(2n − p− s2 − p)(2n − p− s1 − p)
)
≥
q′−1∏
i=0
(
1− (p+ s2 + q
′)(p+ s1 + q′)
(2n − p− s2 − q′)(2n − p− s1 − q′)
)
≥
q′−1∏
i=0
(
1− (p+ s2 + q
′)(p+ s1 + q′)
22n
)
=
(
1− (p+ s2 + q
′)(p+ s1 + q′)
22n
)q′
≥ 1− q
′(p+ s2 + q′)(p+ s1 + q′)
22n
≥ 1− q(p+ q)
2
22n
. (29)
where we use that (1 − x)y ≥ 1 − xy and q′ + s1 + s2 = q. We conclude from
(28) and (29) that
Pr[XO = τ ]
Pr[XP = τ ]
≥ 1− q(p+ q)
2
22n
=: 1−  .
Conclusion. Using Patarin’s H-Coefficient technique (Lemma 1), we obtain
AdvprfSoEM22(D) ≤
q(p+ q)2
22n
+
3qp2
22n
.
6.4 Proof of Theorem 2 on SoKAC21
The proof is similar to the one of Theorem 1 (Section 6.3). Let K
$←− {0, 1}n,
pi1, pi2
$←− Perm(n), and ϕ $←− Func(n). Consider any distinguisher D that has
access to three oracles: (SoKAC21pi1,pi2K , pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 ) in the real world or (ϕ, pi
±
1 , pi
±
2 )
in the ideal world. We assume D is computational unbounded and deterministic.
The distinguisher makes q construction queries to O0 ∈ {SoKAC21pi1,pi2K , ϕ}, and
these are summarized in a transcript of the form τ0 = {(M (1), C(1)), . . . , (M (q), C(q))}.
It also makes p primitive queries to O1 = pi±1 and p primitive queries to O2 =
pi±2 , and like before, these are respectively summarized in transcripts τ1 =
21
{(u(1), v(1)), . . . , (u(p), v(p))} and τ2 = {(x(1), y(1)), . . . , (x(p), y(p))}. We assume
that τ0, τ1, and τ2 do not contain duplicate elements. After D’s interaction with
the oracles, but before it outputs its decision, we disclose the key K to the dis-
tinguisher. In real world, this is the key used in the construction. In the ideal
world K is a dummy key that is drawn uniformly at random. The complete view
is denoted τ = (τ0, τ1, τ2,K).
Bad Events. We say that τ ∈ Tbad if and only if there exists a construction
query (M (j), C(j)) ∈ τ0 and primitive queries (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1 and (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈
τ2 such that one of the following conditions holds:
bad1 : K = M
(j) ⊕ u(i) = v(i) ⊕ x(i′) , (30)
bad2 : K = M
(j) ⊕ u(i) = C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕ y(i′) , (31)
bad3 : K = v
(i) ⊕ x(i′) = C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕ y(i′) . (32)
Note that any attainable transcript τ for which τ /∈ Tbad, implies that τ is a
good transcript.
The bad events (30-32) match those of SoEM22, (19-21), with the difference
that one single key K is used instead of two different keys K1,K2. Indeed,
in SoKAC21pi1,pi2K , every construction query j induces exactly one evaluation
(u(j), v(j)) of the underlying public permutation pi1, and exactly one evaluation
(x(j), y(j)) of the underlying public permutation pi2, and these two queries satisfy
M (j) ⊕ u(j) = K ,
v(j) ⊕ x(j) = K ,
C(j) ⊕ v(j) ⊕ y(j) = K .
As before, (M (j), C(j)) and K fix the value u(j), but there is “freedom” in the val-
ues v(j)⊕x(j) and v(j)⊕y(j). As before, if it happens to be that the distinguisher
queried u(j), this would fix the tuple (x(j), y(j)) for pi2. If the distinguisher also
happened to have queried this one, in the real world it would match but in the
ideal world it would mismatch with high probability.
Pr[XP ∈ Tbad]. We want to bound the probability that an ideal world tran-
script τ satisfies either of (30)-(32). Therefore, the probability that τ ∈ Tbad is
given by
Pr[τ ∈ Tbad] ≤ Pr[bad1] + Pr[bad2] + Pr[bad3] .
We denote
Ω1 =
∣∣∣{(j, i, i′) ∣∣∣ u(i) ⊕ v(i) = M (j) ⊕ x(i′)}∣∣∣ ,
Ω2 =
∣∣∣{(j, i, i′) ∣∣∣M (j) ⊕ C(j) = u(i) ⊕ v(i) ⊕ y(i′)}∣∣∣ ,
Ω3 =
∣∣∣{(j, i, i′) ∣∣∣ C(j) = x(i′) ⊕ y(i′)}∣∣∣ .
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Clearly, as K
$←− {0, 1}n, for any i ∈ {1, 2, 3} and Ai ∈ N, we have
Pr[badi] ≤ Pr[Ωi ≥ Ai] + Ai
2n
.
For i = 1, we will use the sum-capture lemma of Section 6.2. Define
Z = {u(i) ⊕ v(i) : (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1} ,
A = {M (j) : (M (j), C(j)) ∈ τ0} ,
B = {x(i′) : (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈ τ2} .
Then, by Lemma 2 with Ω1 = µ(Z,A,B),
Pr
[
µ(Z,A,B) ≥ qp
2
2n
+
2p2
√
qp
2n
+ 3
√
nqp2
]
≤ 2
2n
.
We thus set A1 =
qp2
2n +
2p2
√
qp
2n + 3
√
nqp2 and obtain
Pr[bad1] ≤ 2
2n
+
qp2
22n
+
2p2
√
qp
22n
+
3
√
nqp2
2n
.
For i = 2, the equation in Ω2 involves two random values (C
(j) and u(i) ⊕ v(i)),
and we resort to a simple Markov bound:
Pr[Ω2 ≥ A2] ≤ qp
2
2nA2
,
and obtain by setting A2 =
√
qp2:
Pr[bad2] ≤ 2
√
qp2
2n
.
For i = 3, Ω3 ≥ A3 means that
Ω′3 =
∣∣∣{(j, i′) ∣∣∣ C(j) = x(i′) ⊕ y(i′)}∣∣∣ ≥ A3/p .
By a simple Markov bound,
Pr[Ω′3 ≥ A3/p] ≤
qp2
2nA3
,
and we obtain by setting A3 =
√
qp2:
Pr[bad3] ≤ 2
√
qp2
2n
.
Summing the three probabilities, we get
Pr[τ ∈ Tbad] ≤ 2
2n
+
qp2
22n
+
2p2
√
qp
22n
+
3
√
nqp2
2n
+
4
√
qp2
2n
. (33)
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Pr[XO = τ ]/Pr[XP = τ ]. The analysis of good transcripts of Theorem 1
(Section 6.3) carries over verbatim with the difference that we generate the
transcripts τnew0 , τ
new
1 and τ
new
2 in the following way. Consider each individual
construction query (M (j), C(j)), if M (j) ⊕ K = u(i) for some i, then remove
(M (j), C(j)) from τnew0 and add (x, y) = (v
(i) ⊕K,C(j) ⊕ v(i) ⊕K) to τnew2 . We
know that if a construction query (M (j), C(j)) collides with (u(i), v(i)) ∈ τ1, then
v(i)⊕K cannot be a valid x(i′) value because of ¬bad1, and C(j)⊕v(i)⊕K cannot
be a valid y(i
′) value because of ¬bad2, for any (x(i′), y(i′)) ∈ τ2. Similarly for
τnew1 .
Conclusion. Using Patarin’s H-Coefficient technique (Lemma 1), we obtain
AdvprfSoKAC21(D) ≤
q(p+ q)2
22n
+
2
2n
+
qp2
22n
+
2p2
√
qp
22n
+
3
√
nqp2
2n
+
4
√
qp2
2n
.
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